The Extended Euclidean algorithm provides a fast solution to the problem of finding the greatest common divisor of two numbers. In this paper, we present three applications of the algorithm to the security and privacy field. The first one allows one to privately distribute a secret to a set of recipients with only one multicast communication. It can be used for rekeying purposes in a Secure Multicast scenario. The second one is an authentication mechanism to be used in environments in which a public-key infrastructure is not available. Finally, the third application of the Extended Euclidean algorithm is a zeroknowledge proof that reduces the number of messages between the two parts involved, with the aid of a central server.
Introduction
Multicast communications allow a host to simultaneously send information to a set of other hosts, avoiding the establishment of point-to-point connections with all of them. IP multicast technologies (which use routing techniques at a low level over a network, such as the IGMP protocol) have not achieved the expected success due to several reasons (need for compatible routers, implantation costs, lack of support from Internet providers, etc.). As a recent alternative, application level multicast has taken over, since it offers the same functionality at a lower cost and easier deployment. Instead of requiring physical deployment, a logical network is built, and hosts resend messages themselves.
Multicast communications can be either one-to-many, if the source of the transmitted data is one entity only over time (such as IPTV or P2PTV services) or many-to-many, if several clients or all act as a source of data. Multiconferences are an example of this (strictly, each data source establishes a one-to-many multicast communication).
There are services that take advantage of multicast but need to keep communications private. Those technologies that make it possible are known as secure multicast. Applications of secure multicast are, among others, pay-per-view IPTV or P2PTV, private multiconferences (oriented to business, politics or even military affairs), or any private service that involves several participants or clients.
The typical approach to establish secure multicast communications is to agree on one or several symmetric encryption keys to encrypt messages (depending on the topology and size of the network). However the key, or keys, must be renewed periodically to prevent attacks from outsiders or even insiders.
Depending on how key distribution and management are carried out, secure multicast schemes are divided into centralized and distributed. Centralized schemes depend directly on a single entity to distribute every cryptographic key, 1. private communications and efficient key refreshment, 2. key server messages authentication, and 3. validation among peers.
Three different and complementary schemes are proposed in order to achieve the proposed goals. Depending on the scenario and its necessities the schemes can be implemented along with the others or on their own.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the scenario conditions we assume for our solution. Section 3 presents the key refreshment scheme, as well as a security and efficiency discussion, a comparison with the state of the art and simulation results. Sections 4 and 5 introduce and discuss the schemes for key server messages authentication and verification among hosts, respectively. Finally, the conclusions of the paper are presented in Section 6.
Scenario
The target scenario is the following: private communications must be established within a restricted group. There is a central server that manages key management issues. From now on, we will refer to the server as the Key Server, and to the clients or users as members. Depending on the nature of the service, communications can be either one-to-many or many-to-many.
In any case, forward secrecy must be maintained. This requirement implies that a member which leaves the network (i.e. her membership expires) should not be able to decrypt any ciphered information transmitted after her exit, and forces the encryption keys to refresh whenever a member leaves the network. Some services may require backward secrecy: an arriving member should not be able to decrypt any ciphered information transmitted before her arrival. This imposes, again, a refreshment of the keys when a member enters the system. We assume our scenario requires it too. These two restrictions may become an efficiency problem if the churn rate (joins and leaves) is too high. The scheme proposed here is efficient enough to cope with high churn rates, as will be shown next.
Obviously, the security and privacy features of an application level secure multicast solution should not only be restricted to private communications. Authentication is a key issue, too. Members should have a way to check that the source of a message is a trusted entity, either if the source is the Key Server or other member.
Distribution of secrets within closed groups
The first scheme allows the Key Server to generate and privately distribute encryption keys among restricted audiences so private communications can be established. Its most relevant features are:
• Only one message is generated per rekeying operation.
• Suitable for all topologies. No need for node hierarchies, though they can be supported.
• No need for message re-encryption.
• Only one secret piece of info is held by each client. We call this pieces member tickets.
• Cost-effective and easy to deploy.
Let us assume r is the symmetric encryption key to be multicast, and that there are n members at a given time. The following paragraphs explain how the scheme works.
When a member i joins, the Key Server assigns it a member ticket, x i . Every ticket is a large prime 1 and is communicated to the corresponding member under a secure channel: SSL/TLS, for example. This communication is made once per member only, so it does not affect global efficiency. All tickets must be different from each other, at least during a relatively wide period of time. Note that x i is known only by its owner and the Key Server, and r is shared by all members and the Key Server.
Algorithm 1 shows the generation and distribution of r.
Algorithm 1
The rekeying algorithm 1. The Key Server selects:
i. m and p, large prime numbers, such that m − 1 = p · q. ii. k and δ, such that δ = k + p and δ < x i , for every i = 1 . . . n. iii. g that verifies 1 = g p mod m.
The encryption key to be distributed is r = g k mod m.
The Key Server calculates
L is kept private in the Key Server.
3. The Key Server finds u, v, by means of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm [12] such that
4. The Key Server multicasts (makes public) g, m and u on plain text.
Each member
New values for m, g, p and/or k must be chosen for each refreshment of r. Note that δ, u and v depend on them and will change as they do. Some remarks can be made to the algorithm. First, a proper value g at step 1.iii is easy to calculate: once the Key Server has chosen m = p · q + 1, a value a is chosen satisfying that m − 1 is the least integer such that a m−1 mod m = 1 (that is, a is a primitive value from Z m ). Then g = a q mod m. Second, the length of r, by definition, cannot exceed that of m, but that should not be a problem for standard symmetric cryptosystems. Third, fortunately it is not necessary, for successive refreshments, to recompute L from scratch if there were joins or leaves: L should be multiplied by the incoming members' tickets, and divided by those of the leaving members. That speeds the process up. And fourth, the Key Server might decide to refresh r after a long period of time with no members joining or leaving for security reasons. That operation is called batch rekeying.
Although the presented method is fast (an efficiency discussion follows), there are scenarios, like pay-per-view IPTV services, in which rekeying is performed at extremely high rates. In those cases a key hierarchy solution can be adopted, such as in [13] , and our method used to refresh the highest level key.
1 Strictly, it is sufficient that all x i are coprime and greater than δ. In that case, however, it would be necessary that every x i has a large prime factor in order to make the factorization of L harder (δ and L will be introduced shortly). 
Proof of correctness for the disclosure scheme
g is public, but the use of δ assures that an outsider will not be able to guess k and, therefore, r.
Scalability considerations for the rekeying algorithm
Kruus [14] suggests five issues that a multicast key management protocol must address. They are:
1. efficiency in initial keying, 2. efficiency in rekeying, 3. computational requirements, 4. storage requirements, 5. scalability.
There is no difference in our scheme between first time keying (requirement 1) and further rekeying operations. Rekeying operations are simple (requirement 2): the Key Server generates a single message which is injected into the multicast network on plain text, since only authorized members will be able to process it correctly. Requirements 3, 4 and 5 are discussed next.
We can observe that L will be large, given that L =  n i=1 x i . So will be u (recall Eq. (1)). In order to estimate it, assume for the rest of the paper that every x i value is stored in an unsigned binary data type of b bits. The greatest value that can be represented is 2 b −1. Assume also there are n members. The maximum length of L is then n ·b bits. That is also the maximum length of u.
As an example, for b = 64 and n = 1000 the maximum length of u is 64000 bits ≈ 8 KBs. Though that is an affordable message length for many devices (requirement 4), a shorter message would be desirable.
From the previous consideration we assume that Kruus' requirements 3 and 5 are the weakest points of our scheme. The solution that allows one to overcome these problems consists of logically dividing the audience into s disjoint subgroups while delivering the same encryption key to all of them. This can be done by running a different instance of the algorithm for every subgroup, with some variations: values m, g, p and k are the same for every subgroup j (and so is δ), but each partial product, L part j with j ∈ [1, s] from now on, contains the product of the tickets of the members within the given subgroup only. With this modification the same key is delivered to every subgroup by means of several shorter messages that are disseminated throughout the network, which is more convenient in terms of efficiency. Now every peer needs only to process the short message addressed to its subgroup.
However, the join and leave operations still require the whole set of members to obtain a new key, therefore s refreshment messages (g, m and the corresponding u) must be computed and multicasted now; each one for a different subgroup. Fig. 1 shows an example: note that all subgroups receive the same g and m (which guarantees that the same key is obtained) but
It is important to remark that such division is logical and independent from the topology of the network, that is, the underlying topology is not affected, neither dissemination of the encrypted information nor rekey messages. Only the Key Server is aware of the global arrangement, while a given peer knows only which subgroup it belongs to. However, in the case that the network topology is naturally divided through time (such as a regional division, for example) a topology-aware logical arrangement may be used.
Adopting the subgroups approach brings many benefits, even though the final bandwidth requirements does not change. First, it is obvious that, for a fixed number of members, the length of u values decreases linearly as the number of subgroups increases. In the previous example, arranging the same audience in 20 groups of 50 members would yield 20 messages of 3200 bits = 400 Bs maximum, each one shorter than a typical X.509 certificate. Shorter messages will be handled more easily and quickly by the recipients. This means less hardware requirements. Second, the message generation process that takes place at the Key Server can be sped up. Every different u can now be computed by a separate process, which may run concurrently with the others. This is specially appropriate for current multi-core processors. The whole process can be sped up by almost s times if the software is properly tuned.
This subgroup approach provides a better scalability, allowing to increase the maximum number of clients that can be handled. As a remark, users should be assigned to subgroups in a balanced way in order to keep refreshment messages as short as possible. This raises other issues, such as the problem of rebalancing subgroups after a leave avalanche, for example.
Security
Security in the distribution of r relies on the unfeasibility of calculating the right δ in a reasonable time if a valid x i is not known by the attacker (recall that values for Eq. (1) in Algorithm 1 are unique). The privacy of k and p is guaranteed if:
• a sufficiently large value is chosen for m, • p and q have a similar bitlength (recall that m − 1 = p · q).
In that case factorizing m − 1 will be more difficult. Additionally, a strong prime can be chosen for m. Next, security is discussed considering three different types of attacker.
Security against a passive adversary.
First, we assume the presence of an adversary who neither has nor has had a valid ticket. Her intention is to learn about the secret value that is being disclosed to legal members. Those members, as was explained in step 5 of Algorithm 1, compute a modular inverse by using their corresponding ticket as the modulo. Clearly, the knowledge of k also implies the knowledge of both δ and p. On one hand p is kept private at the Key Server. On the other hand it is not necessary to get p in order to get the distributed k, say g k , it is enough to get δ and then act as an authorized user. If we take into account δ is the unique solution of the congruence system
, the calculus of such a δ involves knowing L, which is kept private at the server, or one valid ticket x i , which would be equivalent to be an authorized user. Therefore, the alternative is a force-brute attack that, trying with a huge number of possible keys, 2 b , being b the key bitlength.
Security against an active adversary.
Consider the case of a legal member who either is still authorized or her ticket has already expired but keeps rekeying messages from her authorization period. In both cases, she could try to compromise other authorized users' tickets as follows: she knows that would reveal the value of L. However this does not yield any information about other users' tickets since again the factorization of L is involved. Finally, a former user who still holds her old ticket might try to intercept a refreshment message and use her own old ticket expecting that it has been reassigned to a new member. If that was the case it is clear that she would be successful in recovering the secret r. The way to prevent this attack is to never reuse tickets (or for a large period of time at least). Table 1 compares our scheme with other well-known centralized alternatives, which were briefly presented in Section 1. More concretely, we consider the Hierarchical Tree Approach (HTA) in its ''multiple keys per message'' version [1] , LKH [2] and its extension LKH++ [4] , OFT [5] , SKD [7] , ELK [6] and Secure Lock extended with HTA [10] . Our scheme is analyzed in its subgroups version (see Section 3.2).
Comparison with other schemes
Some of the information shown in the table was taken from [15] [16] [17] , while the notation used is explained in the table itself. In order to make a fair comparison three assumptions have been made:
• both backward and forward secrecy are provided, Results depend on several variables. The number of members is, obviously, the most important of them all. For tree-based schemes the degree is also a decisive factor since it determines the number of intermediate keys. In our scheme, the size and number of subgroups are the main variables to pay attention to. Notation is explained in the table itself.
Keys stored in member
Regarding storage, our scheme has the lowest requirements: the amount of information to be stored by the Key Server is directly proportional to the number of users. The tree based schemes must maintain a set of keys for the intermediate logical nodes of the tree (note that 2n − 1 is equivalent to d h − 1 for the case d = 2). Subsets of those keys must be held by the corresponding members, too. In our scheme members only need to store their own ticket.
ELK is ahead of the rest in join events. The combination of a logical tree layout and PRFs allows all members to recompute their key path to the root without any broadcast communication, though some unicast messages are occasionally required for member reallocation. Our scheme sends a broadcast message per group. The rest need one or more messages per tree level.
Leave operations require, in most cases, the same number of messages as joins. Tree-based schemes may need, again, some unicast messages for layout maintenance purposes. Our scheme needs no unicast messages.
It is worth remarking that tree-based schemes need members to be aware of their location within the logical tree: they must hold the intermediate keys that connect them to the tree root (the group key), and recompute all the way back whenever the tree is renewed. Members in our scheme only need to know which subgroup they belong to. This makes member computations simple and fast.
Finally, flash crowds should be considered too. They occur when large sets of users enter or leave the system in a short interval of time. A typical example are pay-per-view massive interest TV events (e.g. soccer matches). At the beginning of the event a great number of users enter the system, which forces one to constantly refresh the group key. At the end of the event those users leave the system, therefore a great number of leave operations must be performed. Tree-oriented schemes may suffer in flash crowd scenarios since the tree structure needs to be continuously rearranged to avoid degeneration, specially at leave events. On the contrary, our scheme can handle subgroups management very efficiently: only multiplications or divisions are needed and there is no structure to maintain. At the start of an event new subgroups can be established if needed, while at the end, the remaining users can be quickly reallocated so the number of subgroups is reduced.
Simulation
We have developed a Java implementation of the scheme in order to perform simulations and obtain execution times. The BigInteger Java class was used for handling large numbers, and the Miller-Rabin test [12] was employed to check primality. Figs. 2 and 3 show execution times for Algorithm 1, both in the Key Server and in a member, for different group sizes and ticket lengths. Tables 2 and 3 show the plotted data. They were obtained in a Intel Core 2 Duo processor at 2, 26 GHz with 3 MB of L2 cache and 2 GB of RAM.
Two main conclusions can be extracted from the Key Server times. First, key pair refreshment messages are computed very fast, excepting in the case of 2048 bits. This means that the scheme can be applied to a wide variety of scenarios. Second, execution times are mainly affected by ticket length and not by the number of members considered. That is good news when large audiences are addressed. However, recall that the length of the refreshment message might force the audience to be split into several subgroups (see Section 3.2). Member times show that retrieving the secret is a very fast process. In some scenarios the subgroups approach might be desirable in order to reduce memory requirements in members' hardware.
Disclosure of public keys
The scheme proposed in this paper can be used for an additional purpose: the refreshment of asymmetric key pairs and the disclosure of the public part. Recall that the encryption key delivered to the audience has the form r = g k mod m, which is similar to an Elgamal public key [18] . An Elgamal key pair has the form:
Therefore, the method can be seen as a way of controlling the disclosure of Elgamal public keys: the public key is only communicated to a closed group of recipients. The key pair can then be used for signature purposes (only the Key Sever knows the private key k) or for encryption of messages addressed to the Key Server.
Key refreshment message authentication
At this point we have achieved privacy in multicast communications. This section presents a mechanism that authenticates the refreshment messages from the Key Server: that is required in order to protect the system against forged rekeying messages. The usual technology for message authentication is digital signature: a hash of the message is encrypted with the sender's private key. The receiver can then decrypt the hash and compare it with its own result of a hash operation on the received information.
We propose an approach which is not based in the use of public key cryptography, as a fast, straight and simple alternative for scenarios in which a public key infrastructure is not available. Our solution proves that the sender either knows or ignores the recipient's ticket. The two only entities in the system that know any given ticket are its owner member and the Key Sever. Assuming the ticket has not been stolen, any message received by a member that successfully runs the verification scheme can only come from the Key Server. The authentication method naturally arises from the rekeying material and no additional infrastructure is needed.
Algorithm 2 shows the rekey message authentication process. We assume the Key Server is performing a refreshment of r, and therefore the authentication process is complementary to that described in Section 3. We assume, too, that members receive the refreshment message.
Algorithm 2
The key refreshment message authentication algorithm 1. The Key server:
ii. chooses a random number a, such that a < x i , for every x i , and iii. multicasts {a · s, h(a)}, where h(a) is the output of a one-way operation on a. Such operation is not specified here. 2. Every member i receives the authentication message and computes h(a · s · r mod x i ), which should be equal to the value h(a) received if x i is a factor of L.
It is convenient that the authentication message is attached to the refreshment message so authenticity can be verified upon reception. If the subgroups approach is used for rekeying then each partial rekeying message for group j must be authenticated separately, using the corresponding L part j value.
Security and efficiency considerations
Regarding security, the key point is that a · s · r mod α is only equal to a if α = L or α = x i ∀x i . An attacker willing to forge an authenticated key refreshment message must know either L or at least one x i . In the first case the forged message will pass the verification test in every client, while in the second case only the owner of x i will be fooled. However, both L and every x i are kept secret, and stealing them is equivalent to stealing a private key. We can therefore state that in terms of security, and for the scenario described in Section 2, the authentication scheme proposed here is a valid substitute for digital signature.
Regarding efficiency, the arbitrary-precision arithmetic additional operations required at the Key Server side are a modular inverse and a multiplication. On the other hand, every client must compute a modular multiplication. Those operations have very little impact on the final runtime since they can be run very efficiently by any hardware with arbitraryprecision arithmetic capabilities.
The scheme poses a disadvantage, however: the authentication message can be as long as the key refreshment message. This should be taken into account in low bit rate scenarios.
Peer validation: a zero-knowledge proof
Once secure multicast and Key Server messages validation have been achieved, the last proposal in this paper deals with authentication among peers. The aim is to verify whether a given peer j holds a valid ticket x j without gaining knowledge of the latter: this means that j is a legal peer, assuming no information leakage. Verification is carried out by means of a challenge, with no disclosure of any private nor sensible information. The scheme is presented next.
Assume that peer i wants to verify whether peer b is a legal peer, prior to establishing communications with it. Algorithm 3 shows the process.
Algorithm 3
The peer validation algorithm. In case this protocol is implemented in a standalone manner and no public key disclosure algorithm is being run then the Key Server must choose the values values g and m as shown in Section 3 and communicate them to peers before any authentication is done.
Peer b calculates w
b = inv −1 i mod x b , β j = w b · (g x i ) x b and sends {β b , g x b } to i. 5. Peer i computes β i = w i · (g x b ) x i ,
Security and efficiency considerations
Security is ensured by two facts:
1. peer b needs to know a valid ticket x b in order to obtain a w b equal to w i , by means of a modular inverse calculation (step 4), and 2. the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field [19] .
We warn now against the possibility of performing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Key Server and peer b, if a malicious entity sends verification requests at an intentional very high rate. That same entity might arbitrarily warn the Key Server against legal peers, too.
Regarding scalability, the protocol involves one communication with the Key Server, which clearly limits its application range. Next, two extensions that partially alleviate the problem are proposed. Both can be combined together. Subgroups approach with trusted super-peers. With the subgroups approach, the global L value is split into different, smaller L part j values. If fully trusted super-peers are introduced, each one receiving an updated version of one or more distinct L part j values from the Key Server, then they can act as signature servers, thus alleviating workload at the Key Server side and increasing overall scalability. Peers can now send their challenge requests to the corresponding super-peer. Given that super-peers are fully trusted our security considerations still hold, and tickets within the product L part j still remain private. Even if a super-peer went malicious and tried to gain access to the tickets, it still should have to factorize L part j , which is a computationally impractical task if a proper ticket bitlength is chosen.
Conclusions
We have presented three different uses for the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, all of them focusing on privacy and security in multicast scenarios. The first one, a rekeying mechanism, allows a single entity to manage the distribution and renewal of encryption keys within restricted groups, so private communications can be held. The communication can be done in a single multicast message, and there is no need for encryption. The mechanism is secure, and simulation results were shown to prove its efficiency, both on the Key Server and on the client side.
The second application is an authentication mechanism which is not based on public-key cryptography. It can be used in situations in which the latter is not available, and can be run along with the first scheme.
Finally, a zero-knowledge protocol was presented which can be used for validation between two clients. By using this protocol clients can decide whether to trust others or not before establishing communications with them. It works by challenging clients to demonstrate that they own a valid ticket. No sensible information is disclosed.
The three mechanisms can be applied to the same scenario, say, a peer-to-peer television platform. Future lines of research include the implementation and test of a combination of them in a simulator (e.g. PeerSim [20] ) or a real testbed, such as PlanetLab [21] .
